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NOTES
Dodging the Bullet: Judicial Review, Presidential
Policy and International Labor Rights Education
and Research Fund v. Bush
I. Introduction
The extent to which the judiciary should review executive policy
decisions has often been the subject of contentious debate because
of the effort to maintain proper separation of powers. In International
Labor Rights Education and Research Fund v. Bush,I the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit was asked to review the Presi-
dent's enforcement of the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP).2 The concurring opinions of the court did not reach the en-
forcement issue, however, and focused instead on two other issues.
The first was whether the Court of International Trade (CIT) had
exclusive jurisdiction to hear the complaint.3 The second point of
contention was whether the complaint was nonjusticiable for want of
Article III standing. 4
The Court issued a two-to-one decision in favor of the defend-
ants, 5 affirming the second of two lower court opinions (Bush I and
Bush II). In her concurrence, Judge Henderson concludes that the
complaint falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Inter-
national Trade, and thus, the plaintiffs' initial forum selection man-
dates dismissal.6 Similarly, Judge Sentelle determines that the case
is nonjusticiable because plaintiffs lack Article III standing. 7 In the
dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Mikva's argues that plaintiffs have
Article III standing, and suggests that judicial review should not be
precluded by any incidental impact on foreign policy.8
This Note will analyze the means by which Judge Henderson
1 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam), aff'g, Int'l Labor Rights Educ. & Re-
search Fund v. Bush (Bush II), 752 F. Supp. 495 (D.D.C. 1990).
2 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (1988 & Supp. 1990)
3 954 F.2d at 746 (Henderson, J., concurring).
4 Id. at 749 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
5 Id. at 746 (Henderson, J., concurring).
6 Id. (Henderson, J., concurring).
7 Id. at 749-52. (SentelleJ., concurring).
8 Id. at 754-57 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
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and Judge Sentelle arrive at their concurring opinions, as well as
Chief Judge Mikva's dissent. Consideration will be given to the
strengths of their various arguments and the weight of precedents
cited. This Note will also consider the place of Bush in the develop-
ing jurisprudence concerning the jurisdiction of the Court of Inter-
national Trade and the nonjusticiability doctrines. Finally, because
the complaint in Bush sought judicial review of a highly political for-
eign policy decision, this Note will explore some of the legal issues
involved in such a request.
II. The Facts of Bush and the D.C. Circuit's Decision
In Bush I, a group of prominent labor unions and human rights
groups alleged that the President failed to conduct a meaningful re-
view of the worker rights practices of the beneficiary developing
countries, 9 as required by the GSP. 10 Plaintiffs sought a court order
forcing the President to conduct a review of the relevant nations'
practices, in the hope that he would deny beneficiary developing
country status to those countries not complying with the worker
rights provisions of the GSP."1
Before the District Court, defendants moved to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction, maintaining that a successful complaint would have
the potential to "provide for" tariffs, and therefore should fall within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade.12 The
court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, conclud-
ing that Congress intended the CIT to have jurisdiction only over
those cases which "arise directly out of an import transaction."'13
The District Court admitted that the GSP would control some of the
conditions under which existing duties would be lifted or imposed,
but concluded that it does not "provide for" tariffs in and of itself. 14
In Bush H, defendants also moved that the claims were nonjusti-
ciable on the grounds that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing.15 In
its examination of the statute establishing the GSP, 16 the court de-
cided that there were no guidelines along which to review the Presi-
dent's determinations as to which countries should benefit under the
9 Beneficiary developing country status permits the subject nation to export their
goods to the United States without being subject to the normal tariffs. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-
66 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
10 Int'l Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 490, 491 (D.D.C.
1990) (Bush I) (citing 19 U.S.C. §§ 2462(b)(7), 2464(b)).
11 Id. at 491.
12 Id. at 491-92.
13 Id. at 491 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,033 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3731, 3745).
14 Id. at 491.
15 Int'l Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush (Bush II), 854 F. Supp. 495, 496
(D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
16 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
410 [VOL. 18
PRESIDENTIAL DISCRETION
GSP scheme. In such a situation, the court concluded that there was
no law to apply and consequently decided the claim was nonjusticia-
ble. 17 The court noted:
Congress has enunciated general policy guidelines and has left it to
the Chief Executive's discretion to carry out policy within those
guidelines. Congress has provided no defined standard for review-
ing his discretionary determinations or determining whether ex-
isting GSP regulations violate the vague statutory requirements, and
any effort such as this to obtain judicial review is misplaced. 18
Therefore, the complaint was dismissed with prejudice. 19
The dismissal was affirmed on different grounds in concurring
opinions by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. 20 In her con-
currence, Judge Henderson affirms the district court's dismissal on
the grounds that the action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of International Trade.2' She determines that the rescis-
sion of beneficiary developing country status would amount to an
imposition of import duties on the subject country. 22 Believing this
would "provide for" a tariff, Judge Henderson concludes that this
action rightfully falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT.23
Circuit Judge Henderson explains that there are two primary
reasons for this decision.24 First, she adopts a broad interpretation
of "providing for," as it is used in the grant of exclusive jurisdiction
to the CIT.25 She cites the Supreme Court's decision in K Mart Corp.
v. Cartier, Inc.26 as authority for interpreting the phrase "relating to"
as equivalent to "provide for."' 27 Judge Henderson goes on to assert
that, under this formulation, the complaint "falls squarely within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade, under sub-
section 1581(i)(2), because the claims raised here 'relate to' du-
ties."'28 Next, Judge Henderson cites legislative history as an
indication that Congress intended complaints of this nature to fall
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of International
Trade. 29
17 Bush 11, 752 F. Supp. at 497.
18 Id. at 499.
19 Id. at 496.
20 Int'l Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 954 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(per curiam).
21 Id. at 748 (Henderson, J., concurring).
22 Id. at 747 (Henderson, J., concurring).
23 The CIT has "exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the
United States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any law of the United States
providing for ... (2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchandise
for reasons other than the raising of revenue." 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(2) (1988).
24 Bush, 954 F.2d at 747-48 (Henderson, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 747 (Henderson, J., concurring).
26 485 U.S. 176, 188 (1988).
27 Bush, 954 F.2d at 747 (Henderson, J., concurring).
28 Id. (Henderson, J., concurring).
29 Id. at 747-48 (Henderson, J., concurring).
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Judge Sentelle specifically rejects Judge Henderson's ration-
ale,30 yet affirms the dismissal on the grounds that the complaint is
nonjusticiable because the plaintiffs lack Article III standing.3' Cit-
ing Allen v. Wright, 3 2 Judge Sentelle maintains that none of the plain-
tiffs meet all three necessary constitutional requirements to have
standing to bring the suit.33 In particular, Judge Sentelle argues that
the human rights organizations lack any tangible injury upon which
to base their claim, and that the labor unions fail the tests of causality
and redressability.3 4 Consequently, he rules that the plaintiffs lack
Article III standing.3 5
ChiefJudge Mikva, author of the dissenting opinion, argues that
the labor unions have standing to bring the complaint, although he
admits that human rights organizations' "abstract concern with a
subject that could be affected by an adjudication does not substitute
for the concrete injury required by Art. III." '36 Nevertheless, he in-
troduces an argument that the human rights organizations' expendi-
ture of resources could reach such a level as to satisfy the "injury"
requirement.3 7 Chief Judge Mikva then concedes, however, that
"the drain on organizational resources is not obvious, and because
the human rights organizations are less directly within the zone of
interests that Congress intended to protect," the human rights orga-
nizations lack standing.38
He develops his argument that the labor unions have standing in
two stages. First, Chief Judge Mikva works to demonstrate that the
unions have been injured by the failure to enforce the GSP provi-
sions, namely the job losses and wage concessions suffered by their
members.3 9 He believes that, due to the failure to enforce the
worker rights provisions of the GSP, beneficiary countries have not
had to enact progressive labor legislation which would make the cost
of their labor less inexpensive relative to U.S. labor costs. It is his
contention that this has resulted in job loss and forced wage conces-
30 Judge Sentelle does not share judge Henderson's interpretation of K Mart, stating
that "the Supreme Court, in the quoted dicta [equivocating 'providing for' and 'relating
to'], does not appear to have been setting limitations on the meaning of the phrase 'pro-
viding for,' nor furnishing synonyms." Id. at 749 (SentelleJ., concurring).
31 Id. at 748 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
32 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984) (stating that to have standing, a plaintiff must allege "(1)
personal injury; (2) fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct; and (3)
likely to be redressed by the requested relief").
33 Bush, 954 F.2d at 749-50 (Sentelle, J., concurring) (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 751).
34 Id. at 750-52.
35 Id. at 751 (Sentelle,J., concurring).
36 Id. at 754 (Mikva, J., dissenting) (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976)).
37 Id. (Mikva, J., dissenting) (citing Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 508 (1990)).
38 Id. (Mikva, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 755 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
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sions in the United States. 40
Second, Chief Judge Mikva cites the legislative history of the
GSP as evidence that Congress established a presumption of causa-
tion and redressability when it passed the GSP.4 1 He suggests defer-
ence to this presumption and indicates that any adverse influence on
foreign policy decisionmaking would be incidental and permissi-
ble. 42 " '[W]hereas attacks on foreign policymaking are nonjusticia-
ble, claims alleging non-compliance with the law are justiciable, even
though the limited review that the court undertakes may have an ef-
fect on foreign affairs ... .' [T]his case presents a conventional statu-
tory question, not a political one, and is clearly justiciable. ' 43
Consequently, Chief Judge Mikva would allow the plaintiffs in Bush
to continue their suit to enforce the worker rights clause in the
GSP.44
IIl. Background Law
A. Generalized System of Preferences
The Generalized System of Preferences is a statutory scheme
designed to allow the President to confer preferential tax status on
certain designated developing nations. 45 The worker rights provi-
sion of the GSP, the statutory origin of Bush, suggests that worker
rights should be one of several criteria for the award of beneficiary
developing country status. 46 To give efficacy to this provision, Con-
gress empowered the President to rescind a nation's preferential sta-
tus upon a determination that a country does not satisfy the worker
rights standards. 47 Plaintiffs in Bush sought a review of the Presi-
dent's enforcement of this provision of the GSP, alleging that he al-
lowed nations to receive the benefits of the GSP without satisfying
the worker rights criteria. 48
Plaintiffs' complaint is assisted by the legislative history of the
GSP. Specifically, certain statements in the legislative history sug-
gest a congressional finding which substantiates the injuries and cau-
sation which the labor union plaintiffs must show to establish Article
III standing. For example, the legislative history indicates Congress'
concern that "the tremendous disparity in labor rights between many
American workers and the absence of those rights for workers in
40 Id. (Mikva, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 756 (MikvaJ., dissenting).
42 Id. at 757 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
43 Id. (Mikva, J., dissenting) (citing DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev.,
810 F.2d 1236, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
44 Id. at 755-56 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
45 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-66 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
46 Id. § 2462(b).
47 Id. § 2464(a)(1).
48 Int'l Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 954 F.2d 745, 746 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
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many developing countries is a growing factor in the competitive de-
cline of many of our basic industries."'49 Similarly, the legislative his-
tory memorializes the concern of some persons in Congress that
the threat, whether explicit or implicit, by American-based multina-
tional corporations to transfer domestic production from the United
States to other countries in which there are no labor rights serves as
a powerful inducement to force American workers to relinquish le-
gitimate rights won through several decades of personal hardship
and struggle.50
Taken together, these statements in the legislative history of the GSP
indicate a Congressional presumption in favor plaintiffs' alleged in-
juries and causation.
B. Jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade
Circuit Judge Henderson believes the CIT should have jurisdic-
tion over Bush.5 1 Congress established that the CIT has exclusive
jurisdiction over any action against a United States agency or officer
"that arises out of any law of the United States providing for . . .
tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes."' 52 There has been considerable
debate, however, concerning what interpretation should be given to
this language. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. most thoroughly confronts
this issue.5 3
Plaintiffs in K Mart sought enforcement of the Tariff Act of 1930,
which forbids a foreign manufacturer from importing into the United
States goods bearing a trademark owned by a United States citizen,
unless the trademark holder gives permission to the importer. 54 Re-
spondents in K Mart maintained that the Trade Act of 1930 consti-
tuted an embargo, for the purposes of the jurisdictional grant to the
Court of International Trade, 55 and as such, could only be adjudi-
cated in that forum. 56
The crux of K Mart thus involved an effort to interpret Con-
gress' language relegating cases involving embargoes to the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the CIT. Plaintiffs advocated a definition of
"embargo" which would include any policy decision resulting in
"import prohibitions. ' 5 7 The Supreme Court rejected this expan-
sive redefinition of "embargo," however, and adopted what it typi-
49 S. REP. No. 308, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4910, 5112.
50 H.R. REP. No. 1090, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5111-12 (statement of Rep. Pease).
51 Judge Henderson raises the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte. Bush, 954 F.2d. at 746
(Henderson, J., concurring).
52 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
53 485 U.S. 176, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
54 Id. at 179 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a)).
55 See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
56 K Mart, 485 U.S. at 183.
57 Id. at 189.
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fled as the "ordinary meaning of 'embargo.'"58 In doing so, the
Supreme Court noted the specificity of the terminology used in other
areas of the statute granting jurisdiction to the CIT. Consequently,
the Court concluded that, if Congress had meant "embargo" to im-
ply anything other than its normal meaning, it would have used a
broader term.5 9
In dicta, the Supreme Court revealed that its motivation for this
strict construction of the language granting jurisdiction to the CIT
was a concern that anything else would not give effect to Congress'
intention to avoid "jurisdictional confusion."'6 0 Given that much of
the holding and the dicta in K Mart emphasizes that Congress' lan-
guage was chosen specifically and should be followed exactly, K Mart
seems to mandate a "plain meaning" construction of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581 (1988). The Court's method of statutory construction, em-
phasizing Congress' intentions when it granted jurisdiction to the
CIT, is highly relevant to an understanding of Judge Henderson's
concurrence.
The remaining background law implicated in Judge Hender-
son's concurrence involves her contention that, in reviewing CIT de-
cisions in previous cases involving the GSP, the court recognized
implicitly the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT over those cases.
Judge Henderson refers to several examples in support of this prop-
osition, and each case she cites involves plaintiffs opposing tariffs
levied on their goods exported to the United States. For example,
plaintiff in Azteca Milling Co. v. United States6 1 contested taxation of
imported flour goods. In Madison Galleries, Ltd. v. United States,6 2
plaintiff litigated tariffs imposed on vases imported from Hong
Kong. Finally, North American Foreign Trading Corp. v. United States6 3
reviewed a determination by the CIT that watches imported from a
beneficiary nation were not tax exempt items.
The similarity between these cases is that the original causes of
action directly contested the actual imposition of import duties, and
the GSP became involved only as grounds for asserting that the
goods should be tax exempt. Thus, the cases cited by Judge Hender-
son show only that the court recognized the jurisdiction of the CIT
in cases involving contested import duties. These complaints prop-
erly fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT because they liti-
gated tariffs, and the GSP became involved as a secondary issue.
58 Id. at 187.
59 "By choosing the word 'embargoes' over the phrase 'import prohibitions,' Con-
gress likewise declined to grant the Court of International Trade exclusive jurisdiction
over importation prohibitions that are not embargoes." Id. at 189.
60 Id. at 187, 188-89.
61 890 F.2d 1150 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
62 870 F.2d 627 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
63 783 F.2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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C. Justiciability Under Article III
Judge Sentelle bases his opinion upon a determination that
plaintiffs lack Article III standing.6 4 Article III, section 2 states that
"the judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, aris-
ing under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and ... to
Controversies." '6 5 Thus, plaintiffs must allege an actual controversy,
if they are to have standing to litigate their complaint. 66 The re-
quirements for Article III standing are explained in Allen v. Wright.6 7
In Allen, the Supreme Court determined that plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing under Article III of the Constitution to bring their claim. 68 The
Supreme Court declared that, to have Article III standing, "a plain-
tiff must allege [1] personal injury [2] fairly traceable to the defend-
ant's allegedly unlawful conduct and [3] likely to be redressed by the
requested relief."'69
The Court further refined each component of this test, stating
that the alleged injury must be "distinct and palpable, 'fairly' tracea-
ble to the challenged action, and relief from the injury must be
'likely' to follow from a favorable decision."' 70 The Court required
that inquiry satisfy these points if Article IIIjurisdiction is to be avail-
able.7 ' The objective of its stringent Article III test is to weed out
those claims asserting government misbehavior which are nonjusti-
ciable. 7 2 These firm guidelines are the principle legal background
for Circuit Judge Sentelle's concurrence in Bush.
There are additional grounds for a ruling of nonjusticiability in
Bush which must be examined, if Judge Sentelle's concurrence is to
be understood within the broader context of the general jurispru-
dence of nonjusticiability. First, the "political question" doctrine
64 Int'l Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 954 F.2d 745, 749 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
65 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
66 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
67 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
68 Plaintiffs claimed that their children would not receive an integrated education as a
result of the Internal Revenue Service's failure to adopt adequate policies to screen giving
tax exemptions to segregated private schools. Id. at 739-40.
69 Id. at 751. See also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separa-
tion of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (stating that "at an irreducible
minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to show [the three
elements]").
70 Bush, 954 F.2d at 750 (Sentelle, J., concurring) (citing Gladstone v. Village of Bell-
wood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979)).
71 "Is the injury too abstract, or otherwise not appropriate, to be considered judi-
cially cognizable? Is the line of causation between the illegal conduct and injury too atten-
uated? Is the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling
too speculative?" Id. at 752. (Sentelle, J., concurring).
72 Id. at 754 (Mikva, J., dissenting) (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop
the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972)).
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generally shields political executive decisions from judicial inquiry.73
The "political question" doctrine, as outlined in Baker v. Cart,74 is
essentially an outgrowth of the general separation of powers, and
asks whether a given governmental'function is assigned by the Con-
stitution to a specific branch of the federal government. 75 To the
extent that certain issues fall within the exclusive purview of the
political branches of the government, they may be nonjusticiable. 76
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 77 pierced the shield of
the "political question" doctrine, but subsequent interpretation of
the APA has indicated others bases for a ruling of nonjusticiability.
For example, in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 78 'the Supreme
Court decided that section 701 of the APA allows judicial review of
all agency decisions unless there is an affirmative showing that the
decision was committed to agency discretion by law. 79 Even under
the Overton Park analysis, however, the Court determined that review
is inappropriate when Congress uses language so broad that there
are no standards by which to review the agency action.80 Therefore,
if Congress did not articulate clear standards against which to judge
agency action, the Supreme Court has indicated that the enforce-
ment of a statute is committed to the absolute discretion of the
agency. 8'
The Court refined further its analysis of the APA in Heckler v.
Chaney.82 In Chaney, the Court retreated somewhat from the Overton
Park holding and stated that agency decisions not to act would be pre-
sumptively unreviewable.83 Thus, a combination of the relevant
holdings in Overton Park and Chaney reveals that agency action is re-
viewable, unless committed by law to the agency's discretion, but
agency inaction is presumptively nonreviewable. In Bush, one obvi-
ous difficulty is in determining whether the President decided not to
enforce the worker rights provisions of the GSP, thus raising a pre-
sumption of nonreviewability, or whether he did act and therefore
73 See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1939) (noting that certain "political questions" may be beyond the scope of review).
74 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
75 Id. at 706.
76 Id.
77 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
78 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
79 Id. at 410.
80 Id.
81 "Review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no
meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion." Heckler
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1984).
82 Id. at 821.
83 Noting that "[an agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of
the statute it is charged with enforcing," and that "[t]he agency is far better equipped than
the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priori-
ties." "an agency's decision not to take enforcement should be presumed immune from
the judicial review under § 701(a)(2)." id. at 831-32.
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should be subject to judicial review. Due to the dichotomy in the
Supreme Court's analysis of the presumptions inherent in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, there are arguments both for and against
judicial review in Bush.
Finally, an important subissue in the "political question" line of
analysis concerns the separation of powers as it applies to the Presi-
dent's foreign policy discretion in particular.84 Although courts have
not always explicitly separated the standard of review applied to gen-
eral agency action from that which should be considered for foreign
policy issues, there has been a consistent emphasis on the special
status of the President's foreign policy discretion. For example, the
Supreme Court has stated that
the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political,
notjudicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution
to the political departments of the government, Executive and Leg-
islative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of
prophecy.... They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary
has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and have long been
held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judi-
cial intrusion or inquiry.8 5
Although it is clear that all courts will not defer entirely to Presi-
dential decisions in the area of foreign policy,86 there is a fairly con-
sistent pattern of granting the President a level of discretion which
extends beyond that given to executive actions in general.8 7 Thus,
when there is a foreign policy issue involved, the presumption of
nonreviewability inherent in the "political question" doctrine is
heightened. Because the foreign policy decisionmaking power is
constitutionally given to the President, the political question doc-
trine may be applied to avoid reviewing Presidential policy choices.
To the extent that Bush involves foreign policy, the "political ques-
tion" doctrine may be implicated.
IV. Significance of the Case
A. The CIT does not have Exclusive Jurisdiction
Circuit Judge Henderson, in affirming dismissal, argues ineffec-
84 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
85 Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman, 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (citing Cole-
man v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939)). See also Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S.
297, 302 (1917) (determining that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Govern-
ment is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative departments of the
Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power
is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision").
86 "It is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign rela-
tions lies beyond judicial cognizance." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
87 See Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman, 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (affirming that
foreign policy decisions are constitutionally confided to the political branches of govern-
ment); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299
U.S. 304 (1939); Oejten v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1917).
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tively that the CIT has exclusive jurisdiction. Judge Henderson rests
her decision on three arguments. The first is her contention that if
plaintiffs are successful in prosecuting their claim, the result could be
the revocation of beneficiary developing country status and a subse-
quent resumption of normal tariffs.88 Consequently, she concludes
that the revocation of beneficiary developing country status under
the GSP would "provide for" a tariff and thus falls within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the CIT.89
There are several weaknesses in this argument. One is that the
GSP sets forth circumstances under which a developing country may
qualify for or lose preferential trade allowances, but clearly does not
"provide for" any tariffs. 90 It is only after beneficiary developing
country status has been withdrawn that the tariffs provided by other
statutes resume. As such, the revocation of the beneficiary develop-
ing country status does not, in and of itself, "provide for" tariffs. For
this reason, Bush should not fall within the grant ofjurisdiction to the
CIT.
A related criticism is that the causal link used to establish plain-
tiffs' claim to an imposition of new import tariffs is too thin to be
convincing. It relies on a chain of assumptions that, if the suit were
brought before the Court of International Trade, a judgment in
favor of plaintiffs' claim might be rendered and the CIT might then
require the President to review the worker rights policies of those
countries receiving beneficiary developing country status under the
GSP.9 1 But it is only if the President then decides to rescind some
nations' benefits under the GSP that one can conclude that this ac-
tion has "provided for" tariffs in any meaningful sense.
Perhaps aware of the tenuousness of this position, Circuit Judge
Henderson makes her second unconvincing argument by attempting
to redefine the required relationship between the claim and a re-
sumption of tariffs. She cites K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. ,92 in which
the Supreme Court replaced "providing for tariffs" with "relating to
tariffs," to support her belief that the CIT should have jurisdiction
over Bush.93 Her reliance on the language in K Mart, however, may
be misplaced. In K Mart, the Supreme Court did substitute "relating
to" for "providing for" to suit the grammatical needs of a passage,
but it is far from certain that the Court intended to suggest a more
88 Intl Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 954 F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (Henderson, J., concurring).
89 Id. (Henderson, J., concurring) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (i) (2) (1988)).
90 Int'l Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush (Bush I), 752 F. Supp. 490, 491-
92 (D.D.C. 1990).
91 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
92 485 U.S. 176 (1988).
93 Int'l Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 954 F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (Henderson, J., concurring).
1993] 419
N.C. J. Irr'L L. & COM. REG.
expansive definition of the CIT's exclusive jurisdiction. 94
On the contrary, the Court points out the importance of follow-
ing Congress' exact language in the very passage from which the
fateful "switch" is extracted. For example, the Court emphasizes
that Congress specifically chose the word "embargo," as opposed to
"importation prohibitions," in its efforts to be precise. 9 5 In its dis-
cussion, the Supreme Court notes that Congress carefully chose its
language to convey a precise meaning and the Court dedicates itself
to interpreting that meaning accurately. 9 6 Given that Judge Hender-
son extracts her ersatz redefinition of "providing for" from a passage
in which the Court is so focused, the suggestion that the Supreme
Court seriously intended to replace Congress' "provide for" with
"relating to" is somewhat ironic. Though the Court technically did
replace "provide for" with "relating to," extracting this as an expla-
nation of Congress' language violates the spirit of the Court's dicta.
Circuit Judge Henderson is therefore unconvincing in her attempt to
suggest a different construction of "providing for."
The third illogical reason Judge Henderson gives to support her
proposition that Bush should be decided by the CIT is that, in review-
ing previous CIT cases involving the GSP, the Court of Appeals im-
plicitly acknowledged the CIT's jurisdiction over all GSP complaints
and therefore, the CIT should have jurisdiction over Bush. 97 The
cases Judge Henderson cites, however, uniformly involve importers
seeking to have their imports reclassified with different duties. 9 8
Thus, the causes of action in these complaints clearly fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT because they directly contest tariffs.
The GSP becomes involved only as an affirmative defense to the
94 Judge Henderson also cites In re Gregory, 705 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1983), which
does construe "provide for" as an equivalent of "refer to." Bush, 954 F.2d at 747 (Hen-
derson, J., concurring) (citing Gregory, 705 F.2d at 1122). The relevant passage discusses
the availability of discharge for debts under a bankruptcy statute. The court concludes
that, for the debts to be dischargeable, the statute must "refer to" them. Gregory, 705 F.2d
at 1122.
95 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 189 (1988).
96 In the same paragraph, the Court goes on note that "to depart from the words
Congress chose would infect the courts with the same jurisdictional confusion that Con-
gress intended to cure." Id.
97 Int'l Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 954 F.2d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (Henderson, J., concurring) (citing Azteca Milling Co. v. United States, 890 F.2d
1150 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Madison Galleries, Ltd. v. United States, 870 F.2d 627 (Fed. Cir.
1989); North American Foreign Trading Corp. v. United States, 783 F.2d 1031 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Torrington Co. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
98 In Azteca Milling, 890 F.2d at 1150, plaintiff contested the taxation of imported
flour goods. Madison Galleries, 870 F.2d at 627, involved the proper level of taxes on vases
imported from Hong Kong. Finally, North American Foreign Trading, 783 F.2d at 1031, re-
viewed a determination by the CIT that watches imported from a beneficiary nation were
not tax exempt items. In all these cases, the causes of action were based on contested
import duties; the GSP became involved only as grounds for asserting that the goods
should be tax exempt. Thus it is clear that the CIT had jurisdiction because the cases
involved import duties, not because of GSP considerations.
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tariff determinations on the goods: the goods should not be taxed
because they either originated from or were "substantially trans-
formed" in a beneficiary country.99 The cases Judge Henderson
cites involved legitimate tariff questions as their causes of action, and
it was for this reason that the CIT had exclusive jurisdiction. The
General System of Preferences was involved only as an affirmative
defense raised after the claims were before the proper jurisdiction of
the CIT.
Even if the Court of Appeals' review of these CIT decisions may
be fairly read as an implicit recognition of the CIT's jurisdiction in
those cases, since they involved different sections of the GSP than
those at issue in Bush, they are not relevant to the jurisdictional is-
sues at hand. Thus, this line of cases cannot fairly be read to man-
date jurisdiction in a case like Bush unless they stand for the
proposition that all GSP-related claims must be heard by the CIT.
Not even Judge Henderson advances such a proposition. Given
these logical difficulties, Judge Henderson is fairly unconvincing in
her argument that, because the court has reviewed CIT decisions on
tariff disputes, it should have exclusive jurisdiction of a case involv-
ing a nontariff provision of the GSP.
Consequently, Judge Henderson is unconvincing in her argu-
ments that the CIT has exclusive jurisdiction over the complaint in
Bush. Her assertion that a decision in favor of defendants in Bush
would provide for a tariff is unconvincing because of a highly attenu-
ated causal link. Similarly, Judge Henderson's redefinition of the
statutory language granting jurisdiction to the CIT is unsuccessful
because it relies on an unfortunate rephrasing given in the Supreme
Court's dicta in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.. 10 Finally, Judge Hen-
derson's argument that past judicial review of CIT decisions con-
firms CIT jurisdiction in Bush is ineffective because the cases cited
were before the CIT for reasons other than their involvement with
the GSP.
B. Lack of Article III Standing
Circuit Judge Sentelle's concurrence is addressed primarily to
whether plaintiffs have Article III standing to bring the suit.' 0
Judge Sentelle addresses the standing of the two different categories
of plaintiffs in turn. The first group are the "human rights" organi-
zations who, as Judge Sentelle persuasively contends, are unable to
establish Article III standing. 10 2 Judge Sentelle focuses on the
99 Azteca Milling, 890 F.2d at 1150; Madison Galleries, 870 F.2d at 627; North American
Foreign Trading, 783 F.2d at 1031.
100 485 U.S. 176 (1988).
10! Bush, 954 F.2d at 749-51 (SentelleJ., concurring).
102 Id. at 750 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
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human rights organizations' failure to "allege an injury that is dis-
tinct, palpable and personal to the plaintiff."' 10 3 The alleged failure
of the President to enforce the worker rights provision of the GSP
probably only represented an ideological setback to these organiza-
tions. He notes that a " 'sincere, vigorous interest in the action chal-
lenged, or in the provisions of law allegedly violated, will not do to
establish standing if the party's interest is purely ideological, un-
coupled with any injury in fact.' ",104 In such circumstances, there is
insufficient showing of an actual injury to sustain the requirements
for Article III standing explained in Allen v. Wright. 10 5 Circuit Judge
Sentelle correctly dismisses the human rights organizations for their
failure to satisfy the injury requirements for standing under Article
111.106
Circuit Judge Sentelle then relies on Article III, as interpreted in
Allen v. Wright 107 and argues that the labor organizations also lack
the necessary standing to bring their complaint.108 Instead of attack-
ing their inability to show a "palpable injury," however, Circuit
Judge Sentelle asserts that the labor unions are unable to satisfy the
requirement of causation. 10 9 In his determination that the labor un-
ions are unable to demonstrate causation, his reliance on Allen is par-
ticularly well placed, though his contention that the causation issues
in Allen and Bush are "closely analogous" is somewhat overstated." 1
The alleged injury in Allen was in conferring a benefit on possi-
bly discriminatory schools, thus presumably having a negative impact
upon the plaintiffs' chances for an integrated education."'I The situ-
ation in Bush is more straightforward, however, because the alleged
job loss is more plausibly a direct result of defendants' actions.' 12 In
this respect, it would be misleading to assert that, for purposes of
showing causation, the situation in Bush is identical to that in Allen.
103 Id. (Sentelle, J., concurring) (citing Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,
100 (1979)). See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) ("The standing question in its Art. III aspect is
whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's
remedial powers on his behalf") (emphasis in original).
104 Bush, 954 F.2d at 750 (Sentelle, J., concurring) (quoting Capital Legal Found. v.
Commodity Credit Corp., 711 F.2d 253, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
105 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
106 ChiefJudge Mikva agrees with Judge Sentelle that the human rights organizations
fail the injury requirement for Article III jurisdiction. Bush, 954 F.2d at 754 (Mikva, J.,
dissenting).
107 468 U.S. at 737.
108 Bush, 954 F.2d at 751-52 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
109 Id. at 750-51 (SentelleJ., concurring).
110 Id. at 751 (SentelleJ., concurring).
III Allen, 468 U.S. at 740.
112 It is often proposed that one of the many factors in the loss of American jobs is
labor's inability to compete with inexpensive foreign workers. The President's choice not
to enforce that legislation which might make foreign labor less inexpensive could have an
impact on jobs and wages in the United States.
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Nevertheless, Circuit Judge Sentelle recognizes that Bush is
highly analogous to Allen because, in both cases, the causal relations
between the defendants and the injured persons are interrupted by
third parties."13 For example, in Allen, the schools which allegedly
were the instrumentalities of injury were independent third par-
ties.'1 4 The Allen decision suggests that it is the intervening pres-
ence of the private schools that most damages the causal chain
between defendants' inaction and the alleged injury in Allen. 115 This
intervening third party substantially inhibits the necessary showing
of causation for Article III standing.' 16
In a similar manner, an intervening third party in the form of the
allegedly recalcitrant nations devastates the chain of causation in
Bush. It is difficult to accept that the President's alleged inaction
caused job loss in America, when there is an intervening nation
which follows its own policies and acts largely without regard for
grants or denials of special tariffs from the United States. "1 7 For this
reason, Circuit Judge Sentelle correctly draws the parallel between
the two cases to show that under the Allen guidelines, plaintiffs in
Bush cannot satisfy the causation required for Article III standing., 18
Consequently, he gives credence to his argument that the causation
of the injury alleged in Bush is too attenuated.
Judge Sentelle does not devote as much effort to demonstrating
that plaintiffs' claim is not redressable, the other requirement for Ar-
ticle III standing which is potentially troublesome for plaintiffs. Hav-
ing already satisfied himself that there were grounds for dismissal of
all the plaintiffs, Judge Sentelle did not need to fully analyze
whether or not plaintiffs' injuries were redressable. Nevertheless, it
might be supposed that since the Court in Allen decided that it was
"entirely speculative" that withdrawal of the private schools' tax ex-
113 Bush, 954 F.2d at 751 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
1"4 Allen, 468 U.S. at 740.
115 "From the perspective of [defendants], the injury to respondents is highly indirect
and 'results from the independent action of some third party not before the court.' " Id. at
757 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42 (1976)).
116 "The Supreme Court has emphasized that 'Art. III still requires that a federal
court act only to redress the injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not injury that results from the independent action of some third party.' "
Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976)).
117 The influence of other, unmentioned economic factors could also account for the
job loss.
I8 "As we noted in Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C.Cir. 1991), Article III stand-
ing is absent where 'the presence of intervening factors' interrupts the chain of traceability
and redressability." Bush, 954 F.2d at 751. See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)
(the Court rejected petitioners' claim that enforcement of a zoning ordinance precluded
the construction of low-cost housing, noting that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that a
removal of the ordinance would necessarily result in the creation of low-cost housing by
third-party construction companies).
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emptions would remove the discrimination," 9 it would be equally
conjectural to conclude that rescinding the beneficial tax status
under the GSP would stop the loss of jobs in the United States.
It is somewhat surprising that Judge Sentelle does not make this
argument, given that his discussion about lack of causation can be
assailed. For example, Chief Judge Mikva correctly points out that
Judge Sentelle fails to address the possibility that Congress indicated
a presumption about causation and redressability to which the court
should defer.' 20 Chief Judge Mikva cites statements from the Con-
gressional Record which indicate that at least certain members of
Congress believed that the lack of worker rights in developing coun-
tries directly injures the interests of the American worker. 12' He
then points out that an indication of a congressional presumption
should be considered, noting out that "even judges who are inclined
to give less deference rather than more have repudiated the sugges-
tion 'that courts should pay no attention to Congress' predictions of
the effect of law.' ",122
Judge Sentelle concedes the point that the judiciary may owe
deference to Congress' intentions,' 23 but denies that Congress has
expressed any such presumption as to causation and redres-
sability. 124 He seems to casually ignore the evidence in the legisla-
tive history of the GSP and reasserts plaintiffs' failure to satisfy the
causation requirements for Article III standing. Given that the legis-
lative history reveals that some members of Congress found a causal
relation to exist,' 25 it seems unusual that Judge Sentelle summarily
dismisses the issue of possible deference to congressional intent.
Judge Sentelle also disdains the suggestion that wage conces-
sions by the labor unions might constitute an injury for Article III
purposes. In fact, he does not even discuss or rebut this possibil-
ity. 2 6 After devoting so much attention to his argument that there is
119 Allen, 468 U.S. at 758.
120 Bush, 954 F.2d at 756 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 755 (Mikva, J., dissenting). See H.R. REP. No. 1090, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5111-12; 130 CONG. REC. 978-79 (1984) (statement
of Rep. Pease).
122 Bush, 954 F.2d at 756 (Mikva, J., dissenting) (quoting United Transp. Union v.
I.C.C., 891 F.2d 908, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). See Southern R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Min-
ing Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 454-63 (1979); Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 499-507 (1977)
(deferring to Congress' intent to prohibit judicial review of an Attorney General's decision
approving a change in voting rules).
123 Bush, 954 F.2d at 751 (SentelleJ., concurring).
124 Circuit Judge Sentelle summarily concludes that "Congress has expressed no such
intention about causation and redressability relevant to the question before us." Id. (Sen-
telle, J., concurring).
125 S. REP. No. 308, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4910, 5112; H.R. REP. No. 1090, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4910, 5111-12 (statement of Rep. Pease).
126 All that Circuit Judge Sentelle says about this possibility is that "any connection
between the actions of appellees in this case and wage concessions, real or potential, by
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weak causation for the alleged loss of jobs, it seems unusual that
Judge Sentelle does not similarly address the allegation that threats
of plant relocations by U.S. companies were used as a means to ex-
tract wage concessions from labor unions. Instead, he only asserts
that there is no evidence that Congress determined the causation of
this alleged injury. 12 7 Once again, his statement on this issue does
not match the Congressional record which indicates that Congress
did recognize a possible causal connection. 128
It is difficult to find any explicit justification for these gaps in
Judge Sentelle's concurrence. It is possible that he was aware of
Congress' statements but independently concluded that the causa-
tion was too tenuous to be considered, even if there was a Congres-
sional presumption. But if such were the case, he should not have
stated categorically that he read no evidence of congressional find-
ings concerning the two alleged injuries.' 29 Furthermore, it is diffi-
cult to accept that Judge Sentelle was completely unaware of the
Congressional Record, since it is cited prominently in Chief Judge
Mikva's dissent.130
Unfortunately, such a paradox reduces one to the level of mere
supposition. It is possible that Judge Sentelle does not bother to
rebut Congress' position, though he clearly acknowledges its exist-
ence,' 3 1 because he believed that his arguments showing plaintiffs'
inability to demonstrate causation were insurmountable. 3 2 Another
possibility is that Judge Sentelle's decision was motivated by other
underlying concerns. For example, had Circuit Judge Sentelle de-
cided as a matter of course, that judicial review of the President's
GSP policy would be undesirable, then he would only need to find a
point upon which to base that decision. If this were true, then analy-
the labor unions remains, in my view, tenuous and I have read no congressional pro-
nouncement to the contrary." Bush, 954 F.2d at 752 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
127 Id. at 751 (Sentelle,J., concurring).
128 130 CONG. REC. 977, 978-79 (1984) (statement of Rep. Pease).
129 Bush, 954 F.2d at 751 (Sentelle, J., concurring).
is0 An unsatisfying explanation could be that, when Circuit Judge Sentelle expresses
his belief that "Congress has expressed no such intention about causation and redres-
sability" to which the court might defer, he means that he finds no evidence of that inten-
tion in the statute itself and disregards the Congressional Record. Id. (Sentelle, J.,
concurring). The fact that Circuit Judge Sentelle makes reference on two separate occa-
sions to Chief Judge Mikva's dissent, however, undercuts this explanation because Chief
Judge Mikva directly cited the passages in the Congressional Record that evidenced Con-
gress' intent. Id. at 758 (MikvaJ., dissenting).
131 Id. at 751 (SentelleJ., concurring).
132 In a subsequent decision, Lujan v. Defendrs of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct 2130 (1992), the
Supreme Court affirmed that, to have Article III standing, plaintiffs must show that they
have suffered in fact an actual injury of a protected interest. Lujan also reemphasized that
the presence of intervening third-parties will disrupt the chain of causation necessary to
demonstrate that the injury resulted from the subject of the complaint. Id. Consequently,
it would seem that Judge Sentelle correctly decided not to devote more attention to the
possibility that forced wage concessions might be an injury.
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ses of other possibilities would become less essential, thus explaining
Judge Sentelle's curious inattention to the Congressional Record.
C. Alternative Nonjusticiability Analyses
By framing his nonjusticiability analysis in terms of plaintiffs' in-
ability to satisfy the respective prongs of the Allen test, Judge Sentelle
may have missed an opportunity to contribute to the development of
positive law. For example, Judge Sentelle could have used Bush to
clarify a difficulty which has emerged in understanding presumptions
of reviewability under the Administrative Procedure Act. The diffi-
culty results from a tension between the Supreme Court's decisions
in Chaney and Overton Park.
Chaney states that agency non-action is presumptively nonre-
viewable.13 3 The corollary rule from Overton Park, however, indicates
that agency action is presumptively reviewable unless the relevant
statute fails to provide meaningful guidelines for judicial review.13 4
Consequently, a meaningful examination of Bush in light of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, as understood by the Supreme Court in
Overton Park and Chaney, would necessarily have to consider both of
these rules which have grown out of the Court's analysis of the
proper role of judicial review of agency action. Though Judge Sen-
telle selected alternate grounds for his determination that the com-
plaint was nonjusticiable, a dissection addressed to separation of
powers would have been more revealing and would likely have ren-
dered the same result.
If he were to undertake such an analysis, the threshold question
would be whether review is sought of agency action or non-action.
In Bush, this issue has the potential to lead one into a factual quan-
dary: did the President "act" by affirmatively determining that the
worker rights standards in the beneficiary nations were satisfactory,
or was there merely a failure to enforce the worker rights standards
of the GSP, thus constituting agency "non-action." If the latter were
the case, Bush would be nonreviewable under the APA, as inter-
preted in Chaney. Clearly, this is a factual determination, but it seems
relevant that plaintiffs brought suit alleging that defendants failed to
enforce the worker rights provisions of the GSP.13 5 This indicates
that the complaint rests on an instance of agency non-action, thus
rendering the case nonjusticiable under the Chaney presumption of
nonreviewability.
Even if it were determined that plaintiffs sought a review of
agency action, thus passing the Chaney test, the complaint still might
'33 470 U.S. 821, 829-32 (1984).
134 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
'35 Int'l Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush (Bush II), 752 F.Supp. 495, 496
(D.D.C. 1990).
[VOL. 18
PRESIDENTIAL DISCRETION
be nonjusticiable. According to Overton Park, if the statute fails to
provide sufficient guidelines for judicial review, a presumption of
nonreviewability is raised on the grounds that Congress must have
intended it to be committed to the discretion of the executive
branch.' 36 Thus, one must examine the language of the GSP in an
effort to determine whether there are sufficient standards by which a
court could review the action. Under such an analysis, Bush would
probably be nonjusticiable because, in the relevant provisions of the
GSP, Congress provides no explicit methodology by which the Presi-
dent is to undertake his review of worker rights. 137 Quite the con-
trary, all the statute requires is that "the President shall take into
account" worker rights.' 38 The only specific directive given else-
where is a definition of the term "internationally recognized worker
rights."1 39
On first reading, this definition might appear to provide a work-
able guideline for judicial review, but a closer examination reveals
that it does not provide a meaningful standard for review. It fails to
do so because the "rights" it attempts to define are enumerated gen-
erally, but without a level of specificity necessary for an objective re-
view of the President's decisions. For example, the definition
requires that the relevant beneficiary nation establish a "minimum
age for employment," but does not say what that age is. Similarly,
the statute requires a finding of "acceptable" work conditions but
provides no criteria by which to evaluate said conditions. The vague-
ness of the requirements renders them almost inherently discretion-
ary. In none of these provisions did Congress establish a specific
baseline by which beneficiary nations' worker rights practices are to
be evaluated. Instead, Congress requires the President to make gen-
eral determinations that there are "acceptable conditions of work"
and "a minimum age for the employment of children," but Congress
neither specifies what those "acceptable conditions" might be, nor
does it state what a "minimum working age" should be.
As such, there are no actual standards by which the judiciary can
objectively measure the President's alleged failure to enforce the
worker rights provisions of the GSP. Overton Park reveals that, in
such a situation, courts must defer to the construction of the statute
applied by the President or the agency involved.' 40 The rationale
136 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410-11.
'37 See 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
138 Id. § 2462(b)(7).
139 These rights include "(A) the right of association; (B) the right to organize and
bargain collectively; (C) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory
labor; (D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and (E) acceptable conditions
of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and
health." Id. § 2462(a)(4).
140 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 402. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc.,
478 U.S. 221, 233 (1986) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
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for this deference is that, by choosing not to provide objective crite-
ria by which to evaluate the President's actions, Congress demon-
strates its intent that those actions be left to the President's
discretion.' 4 1 For this reason, the claim would be nonjusticiable on
the grounds that there are insufficient statutory standards to over-
come the presumption of nonreviewability. 142
There is another point for consideration which Judge Sentelle
chooses not to explicitly address in Bush. As the case strongly. impli-
cates the President's foreign policy decisions, the court must have
noted that at least a certain level of discretion is due under the tradi-
tional understanding of separation of powers.' 43 Though it is clear
that the court would not have to defer completely to the President on
all issues involving foreign policy, 144 it seems rather unusual that
Judge Sentelle does not at least mention this concern as an addi-
tional rationale for his position, especially since the District Court
prominently discusses it.14 5 As the presence of foreign policy con-
cerns does not necessarily render the complaint nonjusticiable, this
seeming oversight on the part of Judge Sentelle probably should be
regarded as merely a component of the larger "political question"
doctrine which he ignores completely.
For the foregoing reasons, it is possible that the complaint in
Bush could have been held to be nonjusticiable for reasons other
than the one Judge Sentelle gives. Although his concurrence is cer-
tainly capable of standing on his determination that plaintiffs lack
standing, a discussion of the reviewability of Bush according to the
guidelines set in the Supreme Court's recent APA jurisprudence
would have been valuable. A possible explanation for Judge Sen-
telle's decision to base his concurrence exclusively on plaintiffs' lack
of standing could be that he recognizes that nonjusticiability was the
basis of the District Court's decision and tenders his analysis as addi-
cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) for the proposition that, if a statute is ambiguous and
the legislative history does not indicate otherwise, the usual practice is to defer to the
agency's construction of the statutory scheme); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 209
U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (emphasizing the singular role of the President in foreign policy
determinations).
141 "In determining whether a question is [nonjusticiable], the appropriateness under
our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the political department
and also the lack of criteria for a judicial determination are dominant considerations."
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55 (1938) (citations omitted).
142 Review of agency decisionmaking has also been declined on the grounds that it
would have "disruptive" practical effects. Southern R. Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling
Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 457 (1978). In the present context, it seems particularly likely that
courts would wish to avoid disruption of the President's foreign policy plans.
143 Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948);
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1917).
144 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
145 Int'l Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush (Bush I), 752 F. Supp. 490, 498
(D.D.C. 1990).
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tional grounds for dismissal.146 Unfortunately,Judge Sentelle's fail-
ure to take a clear position on the District Court's decision that the
claim is nonjusticiable leaves some question as to the relative value
of the District Court's analysis.
V. Conclusion
Bush could be typified as the right decision for the wrong rea-
sons. Judge Henderson's justification for affirming the dismissal,
though couched in an almost plausible argument, fails due to its reli-
ance on an overbroad interpretation of Congress' language, a less-
than-logical argument about the complaint's potential to "provide
for" tariffs, and citations to cases which do not really support her
contention that the CIT has jurisdiction over GSP-related cases.
Judge Sentelle's concurrence and his analysis of the plaintiffs'
lack of Article III standing is considerably less troubled, and his ap-
plication of Allen to Bush is well chosen and effective. Furthermore,
by basing his decision on plaintiffs' inability to satisfy the require-
ments of Article III, Judge Sentelle avoids embroiling the court in
what should rightly be considered nonjusticiable. Nevertheless,
Judge Sentelle's failure to address arguments potentially damaging
to his position does nothing to enhance his efforts.
Considering this mixed balance, it is unclear for what Bush legiti-
mately stands. Given the enormous problems with Judge Hender-
son's concurrence, it probably should not be interpreted as a
legitimate, expansive statement of the CIT's jurisdiction. Judge Sen-
telle, on the other hand, commits a sin of omission by failing to clar-
ify important aspects of the development of separation of powers
jurisprudence. Finally, both judges essentially disregard a substan-
tial subissue in Bush-the "political question" doctrine. Thus, the
ultimate conclusion to be drawn from the case may be that court has
casually avoided the most important issues inherent in Bush.
BRYAN GREGORY
146 Judge Sentelle neither explicitly affirms the basis of the District Court's nonjusti-
ciability holding nor does he overrule it.
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